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It is gener:ally regarded as a truism that currency devaluation
is inflationary, except under those circumstances when a devaluation
would perversely worsen a country's balance on goods arid services.

The

reasoning underlying this proposition is simple and straightforward: a
successful devaluation will increase export receipts and/or divert
import demand to domestic substitutes, on both counts adding to the
total monetary demand in the economy. But increases in aggregate de
mand reinforced by multiplier effects may be expected, by itself• to
worsen the current account.

It follows that conscious policies of de

mand deflation must be undertaken if the beneficial effects of devalua
tion are not to be partially or even wholly eroded through devaluation
induced increases in total demand.
This paper challenges the theoretical proposition that successful
.
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devaluation is always,nflationary and sets out conditions under
which the opposite will be true.

The Currency of Heasurement
A devaluing country is typically interested in improving the
current account of its balance of payments in terms of foreign currency.
Foreign exchange is the scarce resource, of which supplies to the coun
try are inadequate. But the impact of a devaluation on the country's
total money demand must be measured in terms of domestic currency; that
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is the unit of measurement for domestic output, income, and expendi
ture and for any gaps between output and expenditure . For many pur
poses this distinction between foreign and domestic currencies is of
minor consequence . A current account balanced in one currency will be
balanced in the other; a deficit eliminated in foreign currency will
also be eliminated in domestic currency.

When the relationshi p between

currencies changes, however, the distinction between currencies is of
considerabl e importance in a significant class of circumstanc es, and
much conventiona l analysis of devaluation is substantial ly modified by
taking it into account.

In particular, devaluation s that are success

ful in the sense of improving a country's current account position in
terms of foreign currency may nonetheless be deflationar y in the sense
of reducing aggregate monetary demand (measured in domestic currency)
within the devaluing country. This outcome is not merely a theoretical
possibility ; it is a likely one in many less developed countries capital-imp orting countries with rather low elasticitie s of demand for
imports.
The possibility of deflationar y devaluation can be seen most s.imply
by considering the relationshi p

B = rBd, where B

=X-

Mis the

balance on goods and services measured in terms of foreign currency, r
is the foreign-cur rency price of a unit of domestic currency, and Bd
is the balance on goods and services measured in terms of domestic
currency. A devaluation by 6r

<

0 will change the balance measured in

either currency, leading to the relationsh ip:
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(1)

+

where 6 indicate s a change in the variable it precede s.

It is clear

from equation {1) that even when 6B is positive , implying an improve~
ment in the foreign balance, 6Bd may be negativ e, implying a reductio n
in aggrega te money demand in the devaluin g country , so long as Bd is
negative , that is, so long as imports exceed exports ~- a conditio n
usually met in devaluin g countrie s,

Most analysis of devalua tion has

neglecte d this possibi lity because it assumes that trade is initiall y
balanced (B

= Bd = O)

and/or that the magnitud e of the deval4a tion is

"small," so that the quantita tive impact of 6r can be neglecte d. 21

On

either assumpt ion the second term on the right-ha nd side of equation (1)
can be neglecte d, and the change in the balance must have the same
sign no matter what the currency of measure ment.
The movement in opposite directio ns of the balance measured in
the two currenc ies arises because the relation ship between the curren
cies has changed , so that the magnitud e of the deficit measured in domes
tic currency w i l l ~ as a result of devalua tion, before any allowanc e
for economi c adjustm ents in response to the devalua tion.
is actually deflatio nary
Whether or not devalua tion/dep ends on the responsi veness of the
balance on goods and services to changes in relative prices.

The more

responsi ve the balance to changes in the exchang e rate, the less l~kely
devalua tion is to be deflatio nary.

But it will be shown below that

devalµa tion can be deflatio nary even when the convent ional Marshal l-Lerner

-4conditions are met, i.e., even when the sum of the country's price
elasticity of demand for imports and the world's price elasticity of
demand for the country's exports exceeds unity.
To reduce the task of setting out the conditions under which
successful devaluation will be deflationary (6B

>

O;

6Bd

<

O) to manageable

proportions, it will be assumed that the price elasticity of supply of
the devaluing country's imports is infinitely large.

Most countries

are certainly price-takers for their imports, the exceptions being
mainly confined to the largest countries such as the United States and
possibly Britain and Germany.
The formal relationships between devaluation, prices elasticities,
and the change (in either currency) in the balance of goods and ser
vices are shown in an appendix.

In the case of infinitely elastic supply

of imports and for a devaluation that is negligibly small, the following
condition must be met if devaluation is to have
measured in foreign currency:

or

Here e:

x

(2)

!!.Q.

effect on the balance

6B = kMlXn~(l-e:x) - e:m) = 0
M(n +e:)
X X

X. nX (1-e: X >J.·
e:m =Mn
[ X +e: X

is the foreign price elasticity of demand for the country's ex

ports, n

X

is the country's price elasticity of supply for exports, and

§m::l.s th~ country's price elasj:ici-ty- of demand for j.mports, al,l defined

to be non-negative.

X/M is the ratio of exports of goods and
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services to imports of goods and services before the devaluati on; this
ratio is of course insensiti ve to the currency of measurem ent.
k = (6r/r) is the proportio nal devaluati on.
An analogous condition must be met if devaluati on is to have no
effect on the balance measured in domestic currency (6Bd = O):
(3)

t

=
m

1 - X [tx(l+n~) J
M

nX +

X

Equations (2) and (3) form two boundarie s defining three regions,
one in which the balance deteriora tes in terms of both currencie s (the
conventio nal case of "perverse " elasticit ies), one in which the balance
improves in te nns of ho th currencie s , and one in which the balance
improves in terms of one currency but deteriora tes in terms of the
other.

These boundarie s are plotted in Figure 1, treating n

X

and X/M

as parameter s.
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that there may be a substanti al range
of values for the two demand elasticit ies for which a successfu l devaluati on
(~B > 0) may nonethele ss be deflation ary. This outcome cannot occur if
Em> 1, but it can occur for values of ex greater than unity.
If X/M = 1, that is if trade is initially balanced, then
equations (2) and (3) are identical , the two boundarie s coincide, and
the demand-e lasticity field is divided into only two regions. The
,values of)
curvature of the two boundarie s is the same f ~<-- i, and is de
x
termined by the supply elasticit y for exports, n •
~

If this is in-

X

finitely large, ;o-rd would be the case when there was widesprea d unemploy-
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ment and under-uti lized capacity, then the boundarie s become straight
lines and the terminal point of the upper boundary (t.Bd = 0) on the
e:

X

- axis is 11/X.

In this case if X/H = 1 the boundarie s coincide in the

conventio nal Marshall- Lerner condition for no change in the balance,
e: + e:
x

m

= 1, shown as a dotted line in Fig. 1.

Thus there is a sub-

stantial sub-regio n in which this condition is met and devaluati on is
nonethele ss deflation ary.

Smaller·s upply elasticit ies result in greater

curvature toward the origin, and in the limiting case of n = 0 result in
X
the two regions shown in Fig. 2.

In this case devaluati on will always

improve the foreign balance (provided e:m
be deflation ary if e:

m

4 O),

but it will also always

is smaller than 1-(X/M), regardles s of the value

of e: •
X

It is important to note at this point the nature of these elasticities, and particula rly of the elasticit y of demand for imports, e: •
m

These should be regarded as quasi-~ post elasticit ies rather than
as elasticit ies describin g the underlyin g demand condition s.

Many

less developed countries restrict imports severely through quotas
and exchange controls; these controls typically ensure a low value
of e:m.

In these circumsta nces devaluati on may be deflation ary even

when the elasticit y of demand for exports is quite high.

The

elasticit ies are only "quasi" because these M post elasticit ies
should not encompass the impact on imports arising from changes in
the level of total demand.
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Moreover, there is an important element of timing.

Price re

sponsiveness, both of supply and of demand, is likely to be higher
after economic units have had time to adjust to the new situation.

The

supply of exports may be quite inelastic in the short run•but will be
come more responsive with the passage of time.

If the elasticity of

demand for imports is also low, devaluation by a country in deficit may
be expected to be deflationary in the short run, as indicated in Fig. 2.
With the passage of time, the boundaries of the middle zone will shift
northeastward as supply responds increasingly to the new opportunities.
As this occurs, the values for£
The values of£

X

m

consistent with deflation also increase.

consistent with dfl.flation decline, but may remain quite

high (compare Fig. 1 with Fig. 2).

Discrete Devaluations
The foregoing analysis has assumed that the devaluation is
sufficiently small that its magnitude can be neglected in the analysis.
Yet in the "adjustable peg" regime of fixed exchange rates prevailing
in most of the world most of the time this assumption possibly intro
duces important error, since devaluations are usually non-negligible
in amount, typically ranging from 10 to 40 percent.

In fact, however,

allowance for discrete devaluation does not require substantial modifi
cation of the above results except for very large devaluations.
The analogues to equations (2) and (3) become quite complex
when the effects of a discrete devaluation are taken into account (see
the Appendix); certain terms normally neglected must be included,

and of course the results depend on the size of the devaluation itself.
Figures 3 and 4 sketch out boundaries defined by llB = C and llEd =

I)'

divid-

ing: the field into three (or two) regions, as before.

E

are

measured along the axes, and
is drawn for Tix =

00

E

X

Fere 1···'- and

and X/M are treated as para.--ne te rs •

m

Figure 3

and Fig. 4 for Tix = 0, the tuo extrerr1e conditions

with regard to export supply.

The rightmost terminal points on the

boundaries in Fig. 3 terminate on the boundary lines of Fig. 1 (Fig. 3
has been drawn for £x = ().5), where the magnitude of the devaluation is
negligibly small.

The three elemel'l.ts

E

x

,

E

m

,

and k form

B.

sional region which can be in1agined by putting the k-axis
to the page (the E

X

-

E plane) in Fig.
m

three-dimen
perpendicular

1, and Fir,. 3 represents one

cross-section of that region.
It can be seen in Fig. 3 that the region of deflationary devaluation
narrows as the magnitude of the devaluation increases, but it remains
substantial except for very large devaluations.

For values of

E

X

> .5,

however, the middle regions first increases its vertical dimension as tne
devaluation gets larger, then subsequently decreases.

Thus in· this case

a discrete devaluation runs a somewhat larger chance of being detiationary
than is evident from Fig. 1.
Fig. 4 shows the opposite extreme case w"flere exports are completely
inelastic in supply, adding a third dimension,k, to Fig. 2.

Here the

region of deflationary devaluation is obviously insensitive to the
elasticity of demand for exports.

P.s already noted, in this case devalua

tion will always improve the balance measured in foreign currency.
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Figu re 3
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X
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€

m

1.0

b.B > 0
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•'

LIBd < 0

k-1.0
-L=----------

-11Figure 3 brings out the fact that a sufficiently large devaluation
will aluays improve the trade balance (within the framework of this
static analysis), regardless of the size of the demand elasticities (so
long as e:m > 0)

~

even when export supply is elastic.

Thus the "stability

conditions'' so frequently discussed in the literature on exchange rates
are not applicable to discrete changes in exchange rates~ certain. effects
that grow with the magnitude of the devaluation and eventually assure an
improvement in the balance are normally neglected. In particular, for a
given (discrete) devaluation, the percentage decline in export prices
(leading to loss of foreign earnings if e:x < 1) will be smaller than the
percentage increase in domestic prices of imported goods (leading to a
fall in demand for imports), and this discrepancy will grow with the size
of the devaluation. This effect pointing toward improvement is reinforced
if X < M, since the decline in export earnings applies to a smaller base
than the decline in import volume).!
Deflation Reinforces Devaluation
One general conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that
devaluation-induced changes in aggregate demand 9 far from undoing the
effects of devaluation on the trade balance, actually in certain cases
~an be expected to reinforce the effects of devalu~tion on the balance. 1 t
is generally assumed that the effects of devaluation will be weakened or
even eliminated if aggregate money demand is permitted to respond to the
price effects of devaluation. This was the major point of ·the "absorption
approach" to devaluation. But if devaluation worsens the balance in terms
of domestic currency, the level of income and expenditure will be depressed
and that will contribute toward a furtherimprovement in the balance.
In the "Keynesian" case of infinitely elastic supply for both imports
and exports, and where no government action is
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taken to compensate for ti:1e changes in income (hut monetary action is takeri.
to neutralize any monetary effects of the current account deficit), the
ultimate effect of devaluation on the balance on goods anc:1 services (61'.*)
trl.11 be~

(4)

6B* = 6B - (r

+ 6r)

.J!!._

s+m

6Bd

where m is the marginal propensity to import out of additional income, s is
the marginal propensity not to spend out of additional income, and foreign
repercussions are ignored. Clearly if 6Ed < O, the '·final 1 ' improvement in
the balance will exceed the

11

initial" improvement. This contrasts w1 th the
.
s
more usual formulation under these assumptions, 6B* =[
+ ] 6R, where

s

m

the final improvement (after allowing for income effects) is clearly less
than the initial improvement, and possibly substantially less.

This con

ventional expression is in error even when devaluation is expansionary,
since as we have seen 6Bd cannot be equated with 6B.
A second general conclusion to be dralm from the analysis is that
devaluation, even successful devaluation, may generate unemploy.ment and
under-utilization of capacity and hence without corrective policy may lead
to a waste of resources.

This will occur if devaluation results in in

creased expenditures (in domestic currency) on imported goods, diverting
domestic expenditure away from domestically-produced goods and services, and
if the increased foreign expenditure for the country's exports fails to
compensate fully for the reduction in domestic purchases.

Under these

-13circumsta nces the economic authoriti es may rightly choose to expand total
domestic expenditu re, contrary to the advice usually given, and they can
do so without weakening the
balance (6B).

11

initial" effects of devaluati on on the

Such expansion cannot go very far, however, for the de

valuation -induced deflation is limited, and for moderate devaluati ons
will always be less than the initial imbalance , measured in domestic
5/
currency .-

Capital-E xporting Countries
Thus far the analysis has been couched in terms of a country with
a continuin g deficit on goods and services, as would be characte ristic
of a country with a normal import of capital.

A simi~r analysis

applies to a normal capital-e xporting country, a country for which
X/M > 1.

In this case again there are three possible outcomes rather

than the two conventio nally considere d; hut here the middle region
analogous to that in Fig. 1 involved a deteriora tion in the balance in terms
of foreign currency and an improvement in terms of domestic currency.
That is, the boundary 6B

= 0,

running from e

wholly above the boundary 6Bd = O.

m

= X/H toe

X

= 1.0,

lies

A devaluing country falling into

the middle region here will find its trade position worsened by the
devaluati on in the first instance, and the devaluati on-induce d domestic
expansion will tend to worsen the position even further. This perhaps
offers one analytica l reason, although undoubted ly
tant

not the most impor

one, why developed (capital-e xporting) countries are more

reluctant to devalue their currencie s when in balance-o f-paymen ts
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difficulty than is true of the less developed (capital-import ing) coun
tries.

Unless the demand elasticities are markedly higher (as they pro

bably are, however), the prospects for successful devaluation are less
good.

Actual Values of the Paran1eters
Real Horld relevance is given to the analysis presented here by
the fact that many countries do in fact have substantial and continuing de
ficits in their trade in goods and services.

In 1965 no fewer than 19

countries~ listed in Table 1, had a ratio of exports to imports of goods
and services less than J.3.

(Only three countries, the United States,

Uruguay, and Saudi Arahia, had X/"''i in excess of 1.25 \ and that for Uruguay
was aberrant.)

These ratios suggest that the middle region of Fig. 1

(which is dratm for X/M = 0 .6) could in fact be an important one.
Data on demand and supply elasticities are much more difficult
to obtain. As noted above, however, the elasticity of supply of exports
and the elasticity of demand for imports are both likely to be small in
the period immediately following a devaluation, although they may be ex
pected to increase vith time. Thus the timing of collateral measures will
be very important. Secondly, the import demand elasticities in many less
developed countries are held down both by the composition of those coun
tries' imports (oriented heavily to raw materialsj capital goods, and in
some cases foodstuffs) and by import policies that do not permit changes
in relative prices to express themselves fully in changing the demand

-15-

Table 1

Ratio of Expor ts to Impor ts, 10':,S
(Goods and Servic es)
f>outh Vietna m

.46

Tunisi a

.52

India

Pakist an

.52

Sierra Leone

Israel

.5 7

Spain

Jordan

.SB

Indone siaa

.71
.72
.74
.76

South Korea

.5')

Nigeri a

.76

Ghana

.62

Bolivi a

•76

Greece

.65
.66

United AraL T>.epu blic
Dominican Repub lic

• 79

Costa Hica
Haiti

.68

a

Somali a

196li

Source :

ldF, Balanc e of Payme nts Yearbo ok

a

.70

• 79
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for impor ts.

If impor ts are alread y ration ed throug h quotas or exchan
ge

licens ing, raisin g the domes tic price of import s may well
have 1i ttle
or no effect on the quant ity impor ted, yet it will reduce
purcha sing
power in the hands of the public .

11oreov er,

if devalu ation is accomp anied

by some libera lizati on of the import restri ctions , t;e value
of import s
in forei?, n curren cy might actual ly increa se. Analy tically
, the

pre

devalu ation ratio X/M can be regard ed as having been lowere
d• and the middle
region of Fig. 1 is thereb y increa sed in size. Devalu ation
under these
circum stance s is even more lH:ely to be deflat ionary .

Summary

In a range of circum stance s likely to be commo nly found
in many
less develo ped count ries, succes sful devalu ation will be
deflat ionary
rather than inflat ionary , as is usuall y suppos ed. Deval uation
will of
course increa se the domes tic prices of import s and import
-comp eting
goods; it is precis ely this price increa se that is deflat
ionary , since
highe r money payme nts for import s withdr aw purcha sing power
and reduce
expen diture s on domes tic goods. The outcom e is very much
analog ous to
that create d by a rise in excise taxes, which raises prices
but also
reduce s excess demand and is deflat ionary in that releva
nt sense.
When these circum stance s are met, furthe r deflat ion throug
h mone
tary and fiscal polici es, usuall y said to be necess ary to
make devalu ation
work, may be both unnece ssary and inapp ropria te.

Indeed , there may even

be occasi ons on which expans ionary polici es might accomp
any devalu ation,
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in order to avoid unnecessary waste of resources, although in no case
would such expansion be very large.

If deflation is desired on domes

tic grounds, the devaluation will also contribute tmrnrd that end~ and
the resulting deflation will augment the price-switching effects of de
valuation on the trade balance.
Al though the analysis leading to this conclusion is conventional,
it has several limitations.

First 1 it makes no allouance for the effect

of devaluation on international capital movements, although unlike the
more usual analysis it presupuoses continuing capital inflows (or outflows).
Purely speculative reversals in capital flows have little or no effect
on the analysis.

If, however, the devaluing country becomes a more

attractive place for location of industry because of the devaluation, this
may generate some foreign capital expenditure there that would not
otherwise have taken place.
Second, the analysis here has ignored the effect of changes on
the tenns of trade on aggregate spending (the Laursen-Tletzler effect).
For all but the smallest countries, successful devaluation may be expected to worsen the terms of trade on the assumptions made here, and this
will reduce real incomes in the devaluing country• with a resul tin3 reduction
in saving. This effect will be somewhatinflati onary; but it can normally

6/

be neglected.-

Finally, the analysis has been static, ignoring e~tirely dynamic
interactions running from a devaluation-ind uced rise in. the cost-of-
living to Hages and back again.

Aooendix

For a change in exchange rate /:;_r ~ the ha.lance on goods and services
measured in _!oreign curnmcy (:':1) may be expccte<l to change by~
Y
6B = leF -!.
•. [ '-I

(A.1)

n (1-e: )
X
X
n +e:
X

_ e:r/ l+n111 )
n +e:

X

111

Jl

El

The balance f'.teasured it! domeotic currency (Bd) will change by
e: (l+n )
X

(A.2)

e: +n
X

where

e:
e:

X

X

+

)J

nm(1-e: m •
n +e:
m

rn

m

= price elasticity of demand for imports

X

= price elasticity of foreign demand for the country's exports

nm= price elasticity of foreign supply of imports
nx = price elasticity of supply of exports
X = initial level of exports of goods and services
M = initial level of imports of goods and services (subscript
d indicates measurement in domestic currency)
k

= Lirj r = the

proportiona te change in exchange rate

Setting (A.1) and (A.2) equal to zero, specifying
rearranging terms yields equations (2) and (3) in the text.
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Expression (A.2) was first derived by Joan Robinson [11), and the
derivation of both expressions can be found in Alexander [1]. Both of
these authors, however, derived the above expressions by neglecting certain
interaction terms, a procedure that is justifiable only if k is negligibly
small and if interest in the analysis is focussed on stability in the
exchange market.
For discrete devaluations of non-negligible amount, however, the
interaction terms cannot be safely neglected.

Unfortunately, including

them explicitly involves complex expressions in fractional orders of k
and the elasticities. Some idea of the:influence of these terms can be
gained, however, by considering the two analytically simple cases n

X

and nx = O, both for nm =
and 4) we have:

(A. 3)

(A.4)

oa

,

as before.

=

00

For these cases(shotm as Figures 3

-20-

n

m

=

oo

(A.5)

1-E:
l+k(l-1::)

(A.6)

J

m,

It should be noted that the demand elasticitie s in (A.3) - (A.6) are
quasi-expos t elasticitie s, and they may therefore vary with the size of
the devaluation .

The elasticitie s have been somewhat arbitrarily defined

here so as to have the desirable property that E:

X

=

1

will leave total

foreign exchange receipts from exports unchanged and£

m

= 1 will leave

total domestic currency payments for imports unchanged; thus,
l\Q

e:x

=- Q .

q+/J. q
(-q-)

and

i::

m

--

-

(

P

/J.P

+

6P

) --2._
6p

where Q is the quantity of exports and q its price in foreign currency and
Pis the quantity of imports and pits price in domestic currency.

These

definitions differ slightly from those normally used for arc elasticitie s,
but the major conclusions from the analysis are not sensitive to this
alteration.
Equations (A.3) and (A.5) indicate why~ level of devaluation
will always succeed in improving the current balance, regardless of the
values of the demand elasticitie s (provided£

m

>

O): so long as there is

some price sensitivity to the demand for imports, a sufficientl y large
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devaluation will lead to a fall in import volume that more than compensates
£or the loss of export receipts 9 since export receipts "i,1ill decline by
kX{l-E· ) and import volume (o: payments~ since foreign prices are assumed
X
E

constant) will fall by kiJ1+ilc1-e: ) •

... k

in export prices) < - - l+k

For k < 0~ k (the proportiona te fall
0

m

(the proportiona te rise in import prices)., "so

for sufficientl y large k the reduction in imports will outweigh any reduction
in exports,

11

I,
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Footnotes

1/

Changes in the distribut ion of income arising from devaluati on,
and the effects of these distribut ional changes on savings and
imports, including the possibili ty of deflation , have been
recognize d.

J:./

See Diaz [3).

See the classic analysis by Joan Robinson {11].

Also Alexander [lJ,

Fleming [5], Lausen and i1etzler [10), and Tsiang [12).

An ex

ception is Hirscmnan n [8], who early pointed out the possibili ty
that a change in the balance measured in domestic currency might
have the opposite sign from the change in the balance measured in
foreign currency, and therefore that successfu l devaluati onmight
be deflation ary both in the devaluing country and in the rest of
the world.

Haberler [6] and Harberger [7]

also state clearly

that the two balances may move in opposite direction s, but they
carry the analysis no further.

Day [4) is concerned with the size

of the devaluati on required to eliminate an initial trade im
balance~ and of course a deficit eliminate d in one currency will
also be eliminate d in the other.

1/

It should be remembered that the elasticit ies used here are quasi
ex post elasticit ies, and that they therefore take on values appro
priate to the devaluati on in question.

These need not be the same

as the elasticit ies evaluated for small changes in relative prices
around the pre-deval uation position.
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!!._/

See Alexander (1), Black (2), Tsiang [12].

?)

This follows directly from (1):

for successful devaluation

(6B > 0) of less than 50 percent (6r/r > -.5),

This may not be negligible, however. For a country tJhere imports
amount to 20 percent of GNP and exports are only 60 percent as
50 percent
high as imports, the deflationar y impact of a successful/ devaluation
might be nearly

§_/

8 percent of GNP.

Jones' (9] argument that this effect will in any case be only
transitory, on the empirical grounds that the long-run marginal
propensity to save is equal to the average propensity to save,
is perhaps less applicable to less developed countries.
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